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 Abstract 
Despite its potential to raise productivity, performance-related-pay (PRP) is not widespread in market-
oriented economies. Furthermore, despite secular changes conducive to its take-up, there is mixed 
evidence as to whether it has become more prominent over time. Ours is the first paper to present 
firm-level data for the Britain on both the incidence and size of bonus payments in the 2000s.  We 
decompose the share of the total wage bill accounted for by bonuses into the shares of employment in 
the PRP and non-PRP sectors, the ratio of base pay between the two sectors, and the gearing of bonus 
payments to base pay within the PRP sector. We show that there was some growth in the share of total 
pay accounted for by bonuses in Britain in the mid-2000s. However this rise – and subsequent 
fluctuations since the onset of recession in 2008 – can be almost entirely explained by changes in the 
gearing of bonus to base pay within the PRP sector. There has been no substantial change in the 
percentage of employment accounted for by PRP firms; if anything it has fallen over the past decade. 
Furthermore, the movements in the gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy at large are heavily 
influenced by changes in the Finance industry: a sector which accounts for a large proportion of all 
bonus payments in the British economy.  
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1. Introduction
Labour economists ascribe great importance to performance-related pay (PRP) because, 
compared to paying fixed time rate wages, it provides opportunities to increase labour 
productivity by inducing additional effort and attracting high ability workers (Lazear, 1986; 
Prendergast, 1999).  There is abundant empirical evidence in support of these propositions in 
settings as diverse as windshield repairs (Lazear, 2000), strawberry picking (Bandiera et al., 2007), 
and tree planting (Shearer, 2004).  Given its economic benefits one might expect the incidence of 
PRP to be high in market-oriented economies. Yet early studies found PRP was less pervasive 
than might have been anticipated if it was optimal for most firms. 
It is perhaps for this reason that Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent's (LMP) (2009) seminal paper 
attracted so much attention. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) they found the 
incidence of PRP jobs in the United States increased from 38% in the late 1970s to around 45% 
in the 1990s. More telling still, they speculated that secular changes in technology might lie 
behind the growth of PRP.  The first of these changes is skills-biased technical change (SBTC) 
which has increased demand for skilled labour in industrialised economies, inducing employers 
to attract the most able workers by linking their rewards to performance. The second potential 
technical reason for the growth of PRP has been the advances in information and 
communication technologies which have reduced the costs of collecting and processing 
information about worker performance (op. cit., 3). Since these trends in SBTC and monitoring 
costs are likely to be pervasive across advanced market-oriented economies, albeit to varying 
degrees, it is conceivable that they may have led to growth in the use of PRP in recent years. 
However, recent studies inspired by LMP have raised important questions about current trends, 
at least for the United States. First, using establishment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) series (which derives from the National 
Compensation Survey) Gittleman and Pierce (2013) show the proportion of jobs with 
performance pay rose in the 1990s, only to fall in the 2000s such that, by 2013, it had declined by 
about one-fifth in the period since LMD's study period. They test various possible reasons for 
the decline, but none have much explanatory power.  However, they do show that, although the 
decline is apparent throughout the wage distribution and within industry and occupation, it is 
concentrated among lower earners. Second, a series of papers have begun to question whether 
there is positive selection into PRP on ability. Using the PSID used by LMD Heywood and 
Parent (2012) show that among men the tendency for observationally more able employees to 
enter PRP jobs is only apparent for whites, not blacks. Indeed they say "if anything [we find] 
evidence that high-ability blacks sort out of performance pay" (op. cit.: 281). In a second paper 
using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Heywood and Parent (2013) find 
skilled fathers select into performance pay jobs, whereas skilled mothers select out of 
performance jobs.  These findings are not consistent with the standard assumptions regarding 
workers sorting into performance pay jobs on ability, and suggest that any increase in PRP 
incidence driven by SBTC may not be as straightforward as LMP imply. 
These studies raise questions about recent trends in PRP in other market-oriented economies. 
Cross-sectional comparative studies find low PRP incidence rates of around 10-15 per cent in 
many European countries, compared to around 40 per cent in the United States. Only 
Scandinavian countries seem to approach the PRP incidence levels of the United States (Bryson 
et al., 2013). But have other countries experienced any recent growth in PRP?  This paper 
focuses on developments in Britain, a country in the lower half of international rankings in terms 
of the percentage of employees who said they were in receipt of PRP in the mid-2000s (Bryson 
et al., 2013). Evidence through to that point from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) indicated an increase since the mid-1980s in the percentage of all workplaces in Britain 
using PRP schemes, though it was far from uniform across different types of PRP (Pendleton et 
al., 2009). However, the latest WERS, conducted in 2011, suggests that PRP has reached a 
plateau and that, in the case of employee share plans, usage has actually fallen (van Wanrooy et 
al., 2013). The emerging picture for Britain thus has some resonance with that portrayed by 
Gittleman and Pierce (2013) for the United States.  There is little else by way of evidence on 
trends in PRP in Britain however.  One exception is the research undertaken by Bell and Van 
Reenen (2010, 2013) which indicates that annual bonuses have played an important role in the 
growth of wage dispersion at the top of the earnings distribution, especially in Finance, a sector 
which is far more significant for the UK economy than it is for the US. 
We contribute to this literature by mapping the incidence of PRP using firm-level data that have 
never been used before in this literature.  These data are the Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
(MWSS) which are the basis for the Office for National Statistics' Annual Earnings Index.  The 
MWSS is a monthly survey which employers are required to complete under statute.  They are 
therefore high quality, high frequency data.   The survey is large (circa 8,5000 observations per 
month) and is a census of all large firms and a rotating panel of smaller firms.  We use the data to 
test hypotheses regarding secular and cyclical trends in PRP.  
We have three main findings.  First, we show that there was some growth in the share of total 
pay accounted for by bonuses in the mid-2000s. Second, we show that this rise – and subsequent 
fluctuations – can be almost entirely explained by changes in the gearing (or multiplier) that is 
applied to base pay in the PRP sector. In contrast, there has been no increase in the percentage 
of employment accounted for by PRP firms; if anything it has fallen over the past decade. Third, 
movements in the gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy at large are heavily influenced 
by changes in the Finance industry: a sector which accounts for a large proportion of all bonus 
payments in the British economy. One implication is that further research is needed on how 
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firms – particularly in Finance but also elsewhere in the economy – decide upon the appropriate 
size of bonus payments for their workers from one period to the next.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section Two reviews the literature briefly and outlines 
our key hypotheses. Section Three introduces our data and presents our empirical strategy for 
describing and analysing the data. Section Four presents our results. Section Five concludes. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses on the Changing Incidence of PRP 
Both the incidence of PRP and the size of performance-related payments to employees are quite 
heavily contested issues in the literature. There is good economic evidence that PRP elicits 
greater worker effort and can improve labour productivity.1  Thus, one might anticipate a high 
incidence of PRP in the economy, at least in the market-oriented sector seeking to maximise 
profits.  Consequently, evidence suggesting that its incidence is patchy and that, even when it is 
present, it forms a relatively small percentage of total pay, are met with some surprise and even 
scepticism.  
PRP is not necessarily optimal in some settings. For instance, where it is difficult to link the 
effort or performance of particular workers directly to output it may not make sense to resort to 
PRP.  In some settings employers may prefer to incentivise employees using other instruments 
such as career progression via promotion, as is often the case in professions and parts of the 
public sector.2 Nevertheless, PRP remains an option for most employers, both in terms of 
whether to use it and, if so, how much to use.  This is the premise behind the "how good is it?" 
studies which rely on the identification of plausible counterfactual worlds where "like" firms or 
employees do or do not receive PRP.  It is therefore important to understand what might 
determine that choice in the economy. 
It is rare to observe the reasons employers give for the (non)-payment of PRP.  Instead, analysts 
usually observe the incidence of PRP in the population of employees, firms or workplaces. The 
incidence of PRP, and the size of performance payments, is likely to reflect not only the 
preferences of employers but also worker preferences. Workers may not wish to share the 
employer's risk associated with firm or individual performance, preferring instead a standard base 
wage which does not vary with performance or, if it does vary, for the sensitivity of pay to 
performance to be relatively low.3  Employers, recognising the need to trade off efficiency 
1 For a review of this literature see Bryson et al., 2013. 
2 As Prendergast notes (1999: 10), where a worker is paid a fixed salary in a given period “despite the fact that there 
is no immediate relation between pay and performance, he is likely to have incentives to exert effort because good 
performance will improve future contracts. Such reputational concerns imply that effort exertion can occur without 
explicit pay-for-performance contracts.”   
3 In agency theory the standard assumption is that firms are risk neutral while workers are risk averse. The choice of 
contract involves a trade-off between efficiency and insurance. With a fixed wage the worker is fully insured and 
exerts minimal effort, thus reducing efficiency. In a piece-rate contract the worker bears all the risk (no insurance), 
while eliciting higher effort and receiving higher earnings. Where output can vary stochastically workers will seek 
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against insurance, may choose to set the elasticity of pay to performance well below that which 
might be optimal for profit maximisation. International evidence from employee-level data for 
the mid-2000s indicates that  the percentage of employees in receipt of PRP varies markedly 
across countries from around 10-15 per cent in most European countries, rising to around 40 
per cent in Scandinavia and the United States (Bryson et al., 2013).  No such comparative 
evidence exists with respect to the size of performance payments or their share of total wages. 
It is against this backdrop that we test the following hypotheses. 
H1: There has been a secular rise in the use of PRP in Britain 
There are several reasons why one might expect PRP to have grown over time.  These relate to 
falling worker bargaining power, greater potential benefits of PRP to firms, changes in tasks and 
production technology, and shifts in the composition of occupations.  
As noted earlier, the declining costs of the technologies required to monitor output may 
encourage increased use of PRP (McGovern et al, 2007) and skills-biased technological change 
(SBTC) increases the demand for highly productive workers who may be attracted by PRP 
(LMP, 2009: 3). Bryson et al. (2013) show the likelihood of receiving PRP rises with employee 
job autonomy in both the United States and Europe and that, in Europe, it also rises among 
those performing more complex tasks. If SBTC has also resulted in a task-based polarisation of 
jobs in the economy, the growth of highly skilled autonomous working at the top end of the 
occupational distribution may also be conducive to the use of PRP.4 For all these reasons one 
might expect to see growth in the use of PRP over time and, perhaps, a bigger gearing of pay to 
performance where PRP is used.  
A variant of this hypothesis is that production processes are developing in such a way as to limit 
the use of traditional individual PRP, such as piece rates, with employers substituting them 
instead with group-based incentives that complement team-oriented working that characterises 
an increasing proportion of work settings. Freeman and Kleiner (2005) note the demise of 
individual PRP in American manufacturing, while Dube and Freeman (2010) and  Kruse et al. 
(2010) point to substantial growth in financial participation schemes and group-based PRP. 
However, both group-based PRP and individual PRP have been rising in Europe (Bryson et al., 
2013), perhaps because merit pay - based on subjective assessments of employee performance by 
managers and supervisors - has been substituting for other forms of individual PRP.  
compensation for higher risk when moving from a fixed-wage to a piece-rate contract. In practice, most incentive 
pay schemes involve the combination of a base wage, which is fixed, and a variable component (Prendergast, 2000 
and 2002a and 2002b). 
4 The changing composition of the workforce accounts for almost one-third of the growth in PRP in the United 
States during the early 2000s, whereas all the growth in PRP in Europe occurs within-group (Bryson et al., 2013). 
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LMP (2009) also link the rise of PRP in the United States to the demise of trade unionism which, 
they suggest, has acted as a constraint on the use of PRP. Using panel data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the United States O'Halloran (2013) finds that, while 
there is a negative correlation between unions and most forms of PRP, the opposite is true for 
piece-rates. Britain has seen a continued decline in unionisation over the last decade (Bryson and 
Forth, 2011; van Wanrooy et al., 2013).  If one accepts the contention that unions act as a 
constraint on the use of PRP, then one might anticipate their waning influence to translate into a 
secular rise in the use of PRP in Britain. Evidence through to 2004 indicates a rise in the 
workplace incidence of PRP in Britain in the previous quarter-century, although there is no clear 
evidence that this rise is linked to union decline (Pendleton et al., 2009). 
The proposition that PRP may rise over time assumes that the amount of PRP in the economy is 
sub-optimal for employers, or that what was optimal in the past is no longer optimal due to 
changes in the costs and benefits of PRP. This may not be the case however. The dangers 
inherent in PRP are ever-present and well-known.  They include sabotage, ratchet effects 
(gaming), and the exclusive focus on incentivised targets to exclusion of other desirable 
outcomes.  Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employee Costs for Employee Compensation 
(ECEC) data set Gittleman and Pierce (2013) show the percentage of jobs with PRP in the 
United States fell by 10 percentage points in the 2000s such that their incidence is now lower 
than it was in the period covered by LMP's (2009) PSID study. This is the first evidence that the 
continued growth in PRP anticipated by some analysts has not materialised. 
H2: PRP is pro-cyclical  
Some maintain that PRP schemes are sometimes little more than a pay relabeling exercise. For 
example, firms respond to tax incentives when setting up profit-related pay and share ownership 
plans because they are treated as tax-efficient payment methods.  This observation may help 
explain international differences in the incidence of financial participation schemes (Bryson et al., 
2013) and the otherwise hard-to-explain changes in the use of share ownership plans and profit-
related pay in Britain (Pendleton et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in most instances it seems reasonable 
to assume that PRP schemes are genuine efforts by employers to link their employees' pay to 
their own performance or that of the firm, whether as an incentive, or as a means of sharing the 
risks (or profits) arising from fluctuations in market conditions. Blanchflower et al (1996) 
provide evidence that wages change in response to sectoral profitability. Therefore we should 
expect pro-cyclical movement in payments for performance because, on average, one expects 
individual firms' fortunes to rise and fall with those of the rest of the economy. Fixed base wages 
may also adjust to macro-economic conditions, but we would expect them to be much less 
responsive to economic conditions than PRP, and any adjustment we do observe is likely to be 
less pronounced than the adjustment in performance payments.   
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Among employees in general there is evidence for Britain that real earnings have become more 
sensitive to unemployment since the early 2000s (Gregg and Machin, 2012).  Although the 
authors do not investigate how much of this sensitivity is associated with the incidence and size 
of PRP, the magnitude of the change is such that much of it is likely due to the increased 
sensitivity of base pay.5 Empirical support for sensitivity of pay-to-performance is found in the 
executive pay literature where most or all of the adjustment in compensation comes through 
performance bonuses and related options.  However, Bell and Van Reenen (2011) find non-
executive pay is much less sensitive to firm performance.  They argue this is because "only senior 
executives have a large enough share of pay in bonuses to generate a sizeable overall effect on 
pay" (p. 1) while base pay remains relatively insensitive to firm performance. 
Whether firms’ propensity to use PRP schemes is affected by the business cycle is less certain, a 
priori. It will depend, in part, on the bargaining power of workers and firms.  Employers may be 
more eager to share income risks with workers in economic downturns through the promotion 
of PRP, whereas workers may prefer PRP in economic upswings when there are larger rents to 
share. Industrial relations scholars point to the inertia in payment systems and the transaction 
costs associated with changing schemes, considerations which imply movement in and out of 
PRP is likely to be less responsive to the business cycle than we might otherwise anticipate. 
Using a very broad definition of performance pay, Gittleman and Pierce (2012) suggest that the 
steep decline in the number of hours compensated with PRP in the United States since the early 
2000s is most likely due to "cyclical factors related to the Great Recession".  
H3: Explanations for trends in performance-related pay in Britain will be dominated by what happens in the 
Finance Sector 
Performance-related pay is more common in some sectors and occupations than others due to 
the role employees perform in generating sales or increasing production. For example, piece rate 
work is often associated with production line manufacturing while commission on sales is 
common in Retail. The British economy has a larger Finance Sector than most developed 
economies due to the role of the City of London as a centre for listing and trading public listed 
company shares and for trading and investment more generally. Bonuses are an important 
method by which firms recruit, retain and motivate bankers, traders and other corporate 
executives. Some have identified bonus payments to bankers as an important component of 
recent growth in wage dispersion in Britain (Bell and Van Reenen, 2013), while others have 
speculated whether any increase in the bonus gearing of payments to traders may have induced 
risky behaviours which may have contributed to the recent financial crisis. Given the size of the 
Finance Sector in Britain and the traditionally important role of bonuses in the sector we 
5 Van Wanrooy et al. (2013) note a high incidence of pay freezes in the public and private sectors since the onset of 
recession which is consistent with greater cyclicality in earnings more generally. 
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hypothesise that bonus activity in the Finance Sector may have played an important role in 
explaining economy-level movements in bonuses in Britain. 
3. Data 
The results presented in Section Four are based on analyses of the Monthly Wages and Salaries 
Survey (MWSS). The MWSS is conducted each month by the Office for National Statistics and 
provides data for around 8,500 enterprises in Britain. The sample of enterprises (strictly, 
reporting units) is drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register according to a variable 
probability design. A census is conducted among enterprises with 1,000 or more employees; the 
sampling fractions then decline through three further strata (500-999 employees; 100-499 
employees; and 20-99 employees). Enterprises with fewer than 20 employees are not included in 
the survey. The survey covers all industries. Our data cover the period January 2000 to March 
2013. 
The survey contains data on total gross pay for the enterprise in the survey month, as well the 
amount of bonus/commission included in total gross pay. Separate totals are collected for all 
weekly-paid and all monthly-paid employees.6 Bonuses are measured by the survey in the month 
of payment, rather than during the period over which they are earned. All bonuses are included 
with respondents being instructed to include: bonuses; commission; performance pay; annual 
profit from profit-related pay schemes; long-service awards; and – for sporting professions – 
appearance money. Changes in the way the data were collected mean there is a clear likelihood of 
under-reporting before the year 2000, so we begin our analysis of MWSS at this point.  
Participation in the survey is compulsory and so a high response rate is achieved (around 85 per 
cent each month). Enterprises with 1,000 or more employees thus typically appear in the survey 
dataset each month. Enterprises which enter the sample with 20-999 employees are retained for 
up to five years before being rotated out. It is therefore possible to observe many individual 
firms at monthly intervals over a considerable period of time, and so to observe changes in the 
size of bonus payments within firms, both within and across years.  
Whilst our analysis is based on the MWSS microdata provided via the UK’ Secure Data Service, 
we can confirm that we are able to use these microdata to replicate ONS’ published statistics for 
Average Weekly Earnings (for which MWSS is the source).  
In regression analyses we link the MWSS reporting units to their associated enterprise records in 
the Business Structure Database (BSD) as a means of extending the list of firm characteristics, 
which is limited in MWSS. This linkage is feasible for around 95 per cent of all MWSS records, 
and at least 85 per cent in each year.  
6 For weekly-paid employees, the survey asks for total pay paid to employees in the last week of the month.  
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4. Results 
Figure 1 presents data from the MWSS showing the average real wage bill per employee in each 
month from January 2000 through to March 2013 for the whole economy.  The chart shows 
separate series which include and exclude bonus payments.  The figures are in pounds per week 
at 2012 prices.  The spikes in bonus payments capture the within-year variation in bonus pay due 
to the timing of end-of-year bonuses paid between December and March.  
Base pay rises gently until the onset of recession in July 2008 when it flattens and then begins to 
fall.  Total pay follows a similar pattern, but the rise in total pay steepens between 2005 and 
2008, with bonus pay appearing to constitute a rising percentage of total pay in this period. The 
fall in total pay in 2008/9 also seems sharper than that seen in base pay. Nonetheless, whereas 
base pay continues to be subdued in 2010, bonus pay bounces back – albeit not to its pre-
recession peak. Figure 2 charts the share of total pay that is attributed to bonus payments and 
confirms that this share rose in the mid 2000s (particularly between 2005 and 2008). The share 
fell back in 2009 – although only to the level seen in the first half of the decade – before 
regaining much of its ground in 2010. After this point, end-of-year bonuses appear to fall 
slightly, whilst it appears that those paid at other points in the year may have risen.  
The broad patterns are thus evident from Figures 1 and 2, but the exact scale and timing of the 
changes is difficult to discern from the charts because of the seasonality of bonus payments. To 
show these movements more clearly, we aggregate the monthly data into the two bonus seasons 
namely the "high season" which runs from December to March and the "low season" which runs 
from November to April. The distinction between the two seasons is clearly evident in Figure 3. 
The red dots show the mean percentage of pay attributed to bonuses in each month for all 
pooled years: this is clearly highest between December and March, on average. The whiskers 
show the spread of mean payments across years: it is apparent that February bonus payments 
vary most over the years, followed closely by January and March.  There is very little variance in 
the size of bonus payments across years in the "low season".   
To show how the share of the wage bill accounted for by bonuses varies year-on-year, Figure 4 
reprises Figure 2 but splits each year into its "high" season and "low" season. We see a steady 
increase in the percentage of pay accounted for by bonuses in both seasons from 2003 until 
2007/8, during a period of strong economic growth in Britain. Both series fall after the onset of 
recession, although both also bounce back to some extent – high season bonuses doing so in 
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2010 and low season bonuses following in 2011.7 There is then some retrenchment in ‘high 
season’ bonuses between 2011 and 2013, although this is not (yet) apparent in the low season.  
Figure 5 shows the growth rate from the previous like-season (e.g. the first bar shows that bonus 
share in the high season of 2001 was proportionally 14 per cent larger than the bonus share in 
the high season of 2000). The chart shows that the growth rates in the mid-2000s were similar 
irrespective of the season; in other words, although the absolute growth in the bonus share was 
larger within the ‘high season’ series (see Figure 4), ‘low season’ bonuses grew proportionately to 
a similar degree over this period. The chart also confirms that there has been no consistent 
pattern over the last three years of our series.  
These movements in the bonus share are intriguing and, intuitively, we can expect that they may 
arise through a number of different mechanisms. One possible explanation for the growth in the 
mid-2000s is that there was an expansion in the share of all firms using PRP, with a consequent 
decline in the share of firms paying only fixed wages. Another possibility, which might intuitively 
explain some of the cyclicality in the bonus share, is that there have been changes in the size of 
bonuses paid out by PRP firms. We can therefore better understand the causes of movements in 
bonus payments if we decompose the bonus share into its constituent components. In Appendix 
A, we show that the aggregate bonus share in the economy (the share of all wages attributed to 
bonus payments) is a function of: 
(a) The ratio of employment in bonus paying firms to employment in non-bonus-paying 
firms (the employment premium in favour of bonus-paying firms) (EPt) 
(b) The ratio of average base pay per employee in bonus-paying firms to average base pay in 
non-bonus-paying firms (the base pay premium) (RPt), and  
(c)  the gearing within bonus-paying firms (the multiplier that bonus-paying firms notionally 
apply to base pay) (𝐺𝑡𝐵).  
Formally: 
    𝐵𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡𝐵.𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡𝐵.𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 1    (1) 
For instance, if the employment premium is 1.10 (bonus-paying firms employ 52.5% of all 
employees in the economy), the pay premium is 1.05 (average base wages in bonus-paying firms 
are 5% higher than in non bonus-paying firms), and bonus-paying firms pay out bonuses to the 
7 The full set of values is shown in the final two columns of Table 1 in Appendix B. The chart does not show a ‘low 
season’ data point for 2013 we have chosen to end our series in March 2013. MWSS data are available through to 
Jun 2013, but this would give us a low season containing only three of the eight relevant months.  
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value of 10% of base pay (a gearing of 0.10, which implies that total pay is 1.10 times the value 
of base pay), then the overall share of wages attributable to bonus payments is 5.1%.  
Tracking the movement in each of these three series over time indicates whether one component 
has moved more than another over the period in question; Figure 6 shows the monthly trend 
over our period of observation. It is apparent that the most substantial change - both from 
month to month and over time - is in the gearing of bonus pay to base pay in PRP firms. The 
ratio of base pay in PRP and non-PRP firms is flat in comparison.  The employment ratio is also 
relatively flat overall, but drifting slowly downwards. The suggestion here is that firms’ 
propensity to pay PRP has, if anything, been declining, but that movements in the gearing of 
bonus pay to base pay are more important in understanding changes in the economic importance 
of performance pay over time.  
The broad changes are again easier to discern if the monthly data are aggregated into bonus 
seasons. Figures 7 and 8 undertake this aggregation and also index each of the three series on the 
year 2000 (i.e. 2000 = 100).8 Changes in the gearing within PRP firms are the dominant feature 
of both the "high" and "low" season charts. The actual values underlying Figures 7 and 8 are 
shown in Appendix B, Table 1. 
We can further simplify the exposition by observing that the employment premium in favour of 
bonus-paying firms at time t (EPt) and the pay premium in favour of bonus-paying firms (RPt), 
together, indicate the share of all base wages in the economy that are paid out by bonus-paying 
firms (as opposed to non-bonus-paying firms). Formally, this ‘base wage share’ is 
    𝑆𝑡 =  𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡+1     (2) 
We can then show that the share of all wages attributable to bonuses at time t may be expressed 
as: 
    𝐵𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡𝐵.𝑆𝑡𝐺𝑡𝐵.𝑆𝑡+1     (3) 
We use expression (3) as the basis for a shift-share analysis in order to show the influence of 
changes in 𝐺𝐵and S in explaining the total share of the wage bill accounted for by bonuses (B). 
This analysis is presented in Table 1 and confirms that it is the change in gearing - that is, the 
bonus multiplier applied to base pay within the PRP sector - that explains most of the changing 
contribution of bonus pay to total pay across the years covered by our sample period. The fourth 
row in Part A of the table shows, for example, that the bonus share (B) fell by 4.38 percentage 
points between the high season of 2007 and the high season of 2009, and that 4.29 percentage 
points of this fall could be attributed to the decline in the gearing (G) from 27.3% in 2007 to 
8 Note that the high season for 2000 is not a full season because it omits December 1999. 
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17.5% in 2009; the fall in PRP firms' share of base wages (S) from 55.1% to 54.5% could 
account for only 0.13 percentage points of the overall decline in B.  Indeed, in each row of Table 
1 (Parts A and B) we see that changes in the relative size of the PRP sector do not contribute 
very much when compared with the influence of changes in the gearing in PRP firms. This is the 
case in both the "high" and "low" seasons. 
To see whether compositional changes in the firm population - such as a shift in the sectoral 
profile of employment - can account for changes in the gearing of bonuses to base pay, the 
employment share of PRP firms, and the bonus share in all pay, we switch to regression models. 
The regressions focus on S, G and B. For each dependent variable, Table 2 first presents 
estimates for the full sample used in all figures presented above, in which the only regressors are 
the year dummies (see columns 1, 4 and 7). Table 2 then goes on to present estimates from the 
BSD-linked sample without controls and with the removal of all imputed values in MWSS 
(columns 2, 5 and 8); these estimates provide the benchmark for a more complete specification - 
presented in columns 3, 6 and 9 - in which a range of firm characteristics taken from MWSS and 
the BSD are added in order to strip the year dummies of the effects of compositional change.9 
The reference year for this examination of time trends is 2003. In the "high" season there is a 
statistically significant increase of about 5 percentage points in the total pay bill accounted for by 
bonuses between 2003 and 2008 (Table 2, column 7). Just under half of this is accounted for by 
compositional change in firms (last column).10 The bonus share becomes negative and 
statistically significant (relative to 2003) in 2009, in response to the recession, but recovers in 
2010. All of this movement is accounted for by changes in gearing: there is no trend in the 
employment share of PRP firms, that is until 2011, when it falls to around 4 percentage points 
below the level seen in 2003.  Similar trends are apparent in the "low" season, though the 
magnitudes are smaller. 
We infer from the analysis above that there was a growth in the economic importance of PRP in 
Britain in the mid-2000s.  However, this arose through increases in the size of bonus payments 
relative to base pay in PRP firms, rather than a growth in the proportion of all firms using PRP. 
Furthermore, it ceased, at least temporarily, with the 2008 recession, indicating pro-cyclicality in 
bonus payments which exceeded any pro-cyclicality in base pay. There was no substantial change 
9 The aforementioned imputations are undertaken by the ONS, which uses real and imputed values in its 
construction of its measure of Average Weekly Earnings (ONS, 2011). The controls in our regression are industry 
sector; base pay per employee (quartiles); foreign-ownership; legal status; age; organisation size - employment; 
organisation size - number of sites; region. 
 
10 This seems to be largely to do with removing the influence of industry. Finance accounts for a slightly larger share 
of wage-weighted employment between 2003 and 2007 and, although there are more sizeable shifts elsewhere (e.g. 
decline of manufacturing, growth of the education and health sectors), these are much less important than Finance 
in terms of bonus paying. A small increase in the size of the Finance sector is sufficient to make a sizeable impact on 
the overall trend.  
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in the size of the PRP sector; indeed it may even have declined in the final 2-3 years of our 
sample, although we are cautious in stating this too boldly because the decline is only statistically 
significant in our BSD-linked sample.  
Although the employment series in Figures 7 and 8 and in Table 2 look broadly flat during the 
period in the mid-2000s when the bonus share was growing, it is still possible that this growth 
does not arise from changes in firm behaviour and that, instead, there was significant churning in 
the population (i.e. entry and exit from the PRP sector) that brought changes in both the gearing 
and the bonus share. We find that this is not the case: changes in firm behaviour are important. 
Figure 9 shows the share of base wages in the 2007 high and low seasons according to the firm’s 
situation in 2003. It shows that a large proportion of all firms paying PRP in 2007 had also paid 
PRP in 2003 (although there is also a reasonably large share for whom we cannot observe their 
PRP status in 2003, as they were not in the sample at that time). Table 3 then goes on to show 
that firms paying PRP in both periods (2003 and 2007) saw the same increase in gearing as the 
population at large. Put simply, the aggregate changes were not merely the product of switching 
or churning; instead changes in the gearing of bonuses to base pay within individual firms were 
economically the more important feature of the PRP landscape over this period.  
So far our analyses have been conducted for the whole economy but, as noted earlier, the 
Finance Sector has traditionally played an important role in bonus payments in Britain. The 
finance sector is important in any discussion of performance pay because its firms are the most 
likely of those in any sector to pay bonuses and those bonuses tend to be very large. Figure 10a 
shows that firms in the Finance sector are more likely to pay bonuses than firms in other parts of 
the economy (PRP firms account for around 80 per cent of all base wages in the Finance sector, 
compared with around 65 per cent in Other Private Services). Figure 10b then shows that 
changes in the gearing of PRP in Finance are much more substantial than the changes seen 
elsewhere. In consequence, the bonus share is both higher and more variable in Finance than it is 
in other parts of the economy (Figure 10c).  
Table 4 shows the economic significance of the Finance sector in respect of bonuses, by 
computing the share of all bonus pay – and the share of all base pay - that was paid out to 
Finance sector workers in our sample period. The share of all bonus pay going to workers in the 
Finance sector is around two-fifths, but in contrast, they account for only 7% of base pay. 
Finance is the dominant player in the aggregate picture on bonuses in the British economy.  
This raises a question about the size and direction of movements in the gearing and the bonus 
share across the economy, once the dominant influence of Finance is removed.  Figures 11-13 
show the trends, which are similar to that seen for the Whole Economy, but the variations are 
more subtle (and of course the levels are considerably lower). Table 5 presents the regression 
results for the "high" and "low" seasons respectively. It is apparent that the trends are much less 
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dramatic than for the whole economy. There is still some growth in bonus pay, but it is 
considerably smaller in absolute terms. Again, however, it is changes in the gearing that are 
critical.  
What Table 5 and Figures 11-13 highlight is that much of the dramatic change in the bonus 
share seen in the economy at large can be attributed to movements in the gearing ratio of 
bonuses to base pay within the Finance sector. Outside the Finance sector, the changes have 
been considerably more modest. But even here, the gearing (the multiplier that PRP firms opt to 
apply to the fixed part of their wage bill when deciding on the total amount of remuneration in 
the firm) that is the key factor. And whilst the variations are less important economically once 
one moves outside of Finance, the broad trends are nonetheless similar.  
5. Conclusion 
Despite its potential to raise productivity, performance-related-pay (PRP) is not widespread in 
market-oriented economies. Furthermore, despite secular changes conducive to its take-up, there 
is mixed evidence as to whether it has become more prominent over time. Ours is the first paper 
to present firm-level data for the Britain on both the incidence and size of bonus payments in 
the 2000s.  We decompose the share of the total wage bill accounted for by bonuses into the 
shares of employment in the PRP and non-PRP sectors, the ratio of base pay between the two 
sectors, and the gearing of bonus payments to base pay within the PRP sector. We show that 
there was some growth in the share of total pay accounted for by bonuses in Britain in the mid-
2000s. However this rise – and subsequent fluctuations since the onset of recession in 2008 – 
can be almost entirely explained by changes in the gearing of bonus to base pay within the PRP 
sector. There has been no substantial change in the percentage of employment accounted for by 
PRP firms; if anything it has fallen over the past decade. Furthermore, the movements in the 
gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy at large are heavily influenced by changes in the 
Finance industry: a sector which accounts for a large proportion of all bonus payments in the 
British economy. One implication is that further research is needed on how firms – particularly 
in Finance but also elsewhere in the economy – decide upon the appropriate size of bonus 
payments for their workers from one period to the next. 
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Figure 1: Total Pay With And Without Bonuses, Whole Economy 
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Figure 2: Bonuses As A Percentage Of The Total Weekly Pay Bill, Whole Economy 
 
 
Figure 3: Bonuses Paid in Low and High Season as a Percentage of Total Weekly Pay Bill, Whole 
Economy 
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Figure 4: Share of pay bill in bonuses in "high" and "low" bonus seasons, Whole Economy 
 
Figure 5: Growth rate in bonuses compared to previous season, whole economy 
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Figure 6: Decomposition of Change in Proportion of Wage Bill Accounted for by Bonuses 
 
 
Figure 7: Movement in Components Explaining Change in Bonus Payments as Percentage of 
Total Wage Bill During "High" Season (index where 2000=100) 
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Figure 8: Movement in Components Explaining Change in Bonus Payments as Percentage of 
Total Wage Bill During "Low" Season (index where 2000=100) 
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Figure 9: Movements in and out of PRP at firm level, 2003-2007 
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Figure 10a: Share of base pay for firms making bonus payments, by sector and year 
 
 
Figure 10b: Gearing of bonus pay to base pay, by sector and year 
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Figure 10c: Bonuses as share of pay bill, by sector and year 
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Figure11: Share of pay bill in bonuses in "high" and "low" bonus seasons, Whole Economy 
minus Finance 
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Figure 12: Movement in Components Explaining Change in Bonus Payments as Percentage of 
Total Wage Bill During "High" Season (index where 2000=100), Whole Economy minus 
Finance 
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Figure 13: Movement in Components Explaining Change in Bonus Payments as Percentage of 
Total Wage Bill During "Low" Season (index where 2000=100), Whole Economy minus Finance 
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Table 1: Shift Share Analysis Accounting for Change in Proportion of all Pay Accounted for by 
Bonuses, selected years 
Part A: High season 
 
 
Gearing 
(G) 
Share 
of base 
wages 
(S) 
Bonus 
share 
(B) 
Change 
in B 
Part due 
to 
change 
in G 
Part due 
to change 
in S Residual 
Start 2000 17.8% 52.6% 8.6%     
Trough 2003 16.3% 55.1% 8.2% -0.32 -0.66 0.37 0.03 
Peak 2007 27.3% 55.1% 13.1% 4.84 4.83 0.01 0.00 
Trough 2009 17.5% 54.5% 8.7% -4.38 -4.29 -0.13 -0.04 
Peak 2011 22.6% 52.0% 10.5% 1.80 2.25 -0.36 0.08 
End 2013 19.1% 52.8% 9.2% -1.32 -1.45 0.14 0.02 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
Part B: Low season 
 
 
Gearing 
(G) 
Share 
of base 
wages 
(S) 
Bonus 
share 
(B) 
Change 
in B 
Part due 
to 
change 
in G 
Part due 
to change 
in S Residual 
Start 2000 7.8% 53.3% 4.0%     
Trough 2003 7.0% 53.2% 3.6% -0.38 -0.38 0.00 0.00 
Peak 2007 9.8% 53.8% 5.0% 1.37 1.32 0.04 -0.01 
Trough 2010 7.7% 50.8% 3.8% -1.20 -0.99 -0.26 -0.05 
End 2012 9.0% 51.6% 4.4% 0.66 0.60 0.05 -0.01 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
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Table 2: Regressions for Employment Share, Gearing and Bonus Share in "High" and "Low" Seasons, Whole Economy 
High season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Gearing Gearing Gearing Bonus share Bonus share Bonus share 
Sample: All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked 
Controls: No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
2000 -0.025* -0.011 0.003 0.015 -0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 [-2.22] [-0.71] [0.21] [1.03] [-0.11] [0.21] [0.50] [-0.33] [-0.60] 
2001 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.031* 0.010 0.009 0.015* 0.006 0.000 
 
[1.21] [1.41] [1.46] [2.20] [0.73] [0.53] [2.41] [1.05] [-0.06] 
2002 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.006* 
 
[0.76] [0.73] [-0.19] [-0.00] [0.65] [-0.48] [0.20] [0.89] [-2.21] 
2003 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
2004 -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.023* 0.030* 0.032* 0.010* 0.011* 0.006* 
 
[-0.71] [-0.54] [1.02] [2.33] [2.27] [2.47] [2.20] [2.14] [1.97] 
2005 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.036** 0.040* 0.046** 0.016** 0.016* 0.009* 
 
[-0.43] [-0.03] [0.59] [3.15] [2.52] [2.88] [3.08] [2.45] [2.52] 
2006 -0.005 0.006 0.009 0.068*** 0.067** 0.067*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 
 
[-0.53] [0.52] [0.96] [4.22] [3.26] [3.35] [4.38] [3.32] [3.57] 
2007 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.103*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.025*** 
 
[0.05] [0.42] [0.39] [4.68] [4.09] [3.91] [5.25] [4.31] [4.58] 
2008 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.111*** 0.139*** 0.118*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.028*** 
 
[-0.39] [0.02] [-0.61] [5.00] [4.85] [4.52] [5.60] [5.13] [5.19] 
2009 -0.006 0.007 0.004 0.012 -0.049** -0.066** 0.005 -0.019** -0.018** 
 
[-0.47] [0.43] [0.26] [0.99] [-2.78] [-2.83] [0.85] [-2.69] [-3.18] 
2010 -0.017 -0.025 -0.018 0.053** 0.041 0.032 0.021** 0.012 0.008 
 
[-1.29] [-1.55] [-1.22] [3.07] [1.91] [1.66] [2.88] [1.43] [1.76] 
2011 -0.031 -0.039* -0.039* 0.063** 0.066** 0.025 0.023** 0.018* 0.007 
 
[-1.15] [-1.96] [-2.28] [3.02] [2.83] [1.18] [2.84] [2.16] [1.54] 
2012 -0.025 -0.038 -0.045** 0.042* 0.061** 0.006 0.015* 0.017* 0.003 
 
[-0.97] [-1.96] [-2.81] [2.55] [3.26] [0.26] [2.33] [2.38] [0.58] 
2013 -0.023 -0.024 -0.031 0.028 0.031 -0.017 0.009 0.008 -0.005 
 
[-0.87] [-1.20] [-1.94] [1.73] [1.63] [-0.79] [1.46] [1.15] [-1.02] 
N 479,113 389,589 389,589 173,951 145,259 145,259 479,113 389,589 389,589 
R-sq 0.001 0.001 0.225 0.001 0.003 0.109 0.005 0.007 0.409 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2 continued 
Low  season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Gearing Gearing Gearing Bonus share Bonus share Bonus share 
Sample: All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked 
Controls: No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
2000 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.012*** 0.012** 0.004 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 
[0.07] [0.43] [1.09] [1.95] [3.56] [3.08] [1.91] [3.47] [3.92] 
2001 0.013 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.007* 0.005 0.003 0.004** 0.003** 
 
[1.69] [0.99] [0.50] [1.12] [2.55] [1.63] [1.56] [3.05] [2.62] 
2002 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
[0.98] [0.65] [-0.39] [0.18] [0.96] [0.04] [0.41] [1.18] [0.32] 
2003 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
2004 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.003 0.002 0.003* 
 
[0.13] [0.32] [1.72] [1.98] [2.05] [2.26] [1.90] [1.88] [2.53] 
2005 0.000 0.008 0.011 0.010** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.005* 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
[0.01] [0.86] [1.49] [2.63] [3.62] [3.84] [2.55] [3.68] [3.89] 
2006 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
[-0.02] [0.59] [0.63] [4.48] [5.00] [4.54] [4.48] [5.05] [4.64] 
2007 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
[0.51] [0.66] [0.28] [5.09] [5.38] [4.79] [5.33] [5.49] [4.75] 
2008 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 
[0.57] [0.45] [-0.03] [4.23] [5.00] [4.04] [4.54] [4.87] [3.85] 
2009 -0.010 -0.020 -0.019 0.010* 0.009 0.005 0.004* 0.002 0.001 
 
[-0.80] [-1.29] [-1.33] [2.20] [1.82] [1.00] [2.00] [1.19] [0.36] 
2010 -0.024 -0.033* -0.031* 0.007 0.011* 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 
[-1.30] [-1.97] [-2.05] [1.32] [2.17] [0.86] [0.68] [1.04] [0.20] 
2011 -0.021 -0.034 -0.041** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.016** 0.008* 0.008** 0.004 
 
[-0.82] [-1.87] [-2.67] [2.76] [3.88] [2.83] [2.45] [2.78] [1.82] 
2012 -0.016 -0.024 -0.034* 0.020** 0.025*** 0.013** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.004* 
 
[-0.61] [-1.23] [-2.05] [3.05] [4.80] [2.88] [2.86] [3.83] [2.24] 
N 889,673 759,490 759,490 304,073 264,904 264,904 889,673 759,490 759,490 
R-sq 0.000 0.001 0.223 0.001 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.001 0.100 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (Jan 2000 – Mar 2013) 
 
30 
 
Table 3: Variations in gearing, 2003 and 2007 
 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
Table 4: Sectoral shares of all Base Pay And Bonus Pay, Jan 2000 – March 2013 
 
Share of all 
bonus pay 
Share of all 
regular pay 
Finance (J) 39% 7% 
Other private services (G-I, K, 
O) 45% 45% 
Production (A-F) 15% 21% 
Public services (L-N) 1% 26% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
 
 
 
 
High season Low season 
 
2003 2007 2003 2007 
Firms paying PRP in both 
years 15% 25% 7% 10% 
Firms paying PRP only in 
2003 23% 
 
13% 
 Firms paying PRP only in 
2007 
 
35% 
 
16% 
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Table 5: Regressions for Employment Share, Gearing and Bonus Share in "High" and "Low" Seasons, Whole Economy minus Finance 
High season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Gearing Gearing Gearing Bonus share Bonus share Bonus share 
Sample: All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked 
Controls: No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
2000 -0.015 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.003 
 [-1.31] [-0.07] [1.19] [-0.16] [0.31] [0.06] [-0.54] [0.26] [1.15] 
2001 0.014 0.019* 0.021* 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
[1.94] [2.05] [2.08] [0.03] [0.63] [0.24] [0.60] [1.55] [1.33] 
2002 0.009 0.010 0.005 -0.009** -0.004 -0.009** -0.003* -0.001 -0.003 
 
[1.60] [1.26] [0.64] [-2.61] [-1.15] [-2.68] [-2.16] [-0.48] [-1.87] 
2003 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
2004 -0.005 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
[-0.89] [-0.39] [1.07] [-0.47] [0.99] [1.30] [-0.67] [0.76] [0.61] 
2005 -0.005 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.003 0.002 
 
[-0.53] [-0.01] [0.51] [-0.31] [1.68] [1.72] [-0.48] [1.45] [0.98] 
2006 -0.006 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.011* 0.007 0.001 0.005* 0.003 
 
[-0.64] [0.42] [0.81] [0.83] [2.49] [1.45] [0.53] [2.42] [1.54] 
2007 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.016** 0.008 0.004 0.006** 0.004 
 
[-0.19] [0.12] [0.22] [1.54] [2.80] [1.35] [1.41] [2.88] [1.70] 
2008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 0.016** 0.021*** 0.011 0.007* 0.008*** 0.004 
 
[-0.55] [-0.21] [-0.61] [2.61] [3.51] [1.79] [2.32] [3.38] [1.64] 
2009 -0.007 0.008 0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.016* -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
 
[-0.54] [0.48] [0.29] [0.04] [-0.60] [-2.33] [-0.18] [-0.36] [-1.84] 
2010 -0.016 -0.022 -0.016 0.021** 0.028*** 0.016* 0.008** 0.009*** 0.005* 
 
[-1.19] [-1.34] [-1.00] [3.15] [3.95] [2.38] [2.76] [3.54] [1.97] 
2011 -0.035 -0.043* -0.042* 0.020* 0.035*** 0.017* 0.005 0.008*** 0.003 
 
[-1.20] [-2.15] [-2.31] [2.37] [4.63] [2.57] [1.54] [3.36] [1.37] 
2012 -0.030 -0.045* -0.048** 0.022** 0.041*** 0.018** 0.007 0.010*** 0.004 
 
[-1.06] [-2.38] [-2.89] [2.66] [5.61] [2.61] [1.93] [4.04] [1.46] 
2013 -0.026 -0.028 -0.032 0.009 0.022** -0.002 0.002 0.006* -0.001 
 
[-0.92] [-1.45] [-1.87] [1.11] [2.94] [-0.27] [0.46] [2.22] [-0.53] 
N 457,877 372,691 372,691 159,934 133,853 133,853 457,877 372,691 372,691 
R-sq 0.001 0.001 0.183 0.001 0.003 0.064 0.001 0.001 0.119 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 5 continued 
Low  season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Base wage 
share 
Gearing Gearing Gearing Bonus share Bonus share Bonus share 
Sample: All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked All BSD-linked BSD-linked 
Controls: No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
2000 0.009 0.012 0.019 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.004** 0.004* 0.006*** 
 
[1.04] [1.01] [1.81] [2.35] [2.10] [2.11] [2.59] [2.38] [3.55] 
2001 0.018* 0.012 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 
 
[2.49] [1.19] [1.04] [1.65] [1.08] [0.58] [2.43] [1.76] [2.09] 
2002 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 
[1.28] [0.70] [0.08] [1.30] [0.34] [-0.33] [1.63] [0.64] [0.36] 
2003 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
2004 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.002* 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.12] [0.21] [1.48] [2.65] [1.39] [1.54] [2.51] [1.32] [1.56] 
2005 0.000 0.007 0.010 0.007** 0.009* 0.008* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 
 
[0.02] [0.73] [1.27] [2.90] [2.43] [2.44] [2.76] [2.64] [2.40] 
2006 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 
 
[-0.11] [0.36] [0.44] [4.07] [3.55] [2.74] [3.87] [3.65] [2.86] 
2007 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 
[0.38] [0.35] [0.16] [5.80] [4.65] [3.90] [5.91] [4.70] [3.75] 
2008 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.011** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004* 
 
[0.40] [0.05] [-0.21] [4.22] [3.86] [2.79] [4.50] [3.68] [2.44] 
2009 -0.009 -0.020 -0.020 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 
[-0.67] [-1.29] [-1.26] [0.94] [0.60] [-0.41] [0.64] [-0.07] [-0.97] 
2010 -0.025 -0.036* -0.033* -0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003* 
 
[-1.30] [-2.16] [-2.04] [-0.29] [0.96] [-1.14] [-1.32] [-0.78] [-2.01] 
2011 -0.025 -0.041* -0.045** 0.013* 0.014*** 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000 
 
[-0.87] [-2.28] [-2.72] [2.11] [3.63] [1.45] [1.62] [1.74] [-0.20] 
2012 -0.019 -0.031 -0.038* 0.016** 0.019*** 0.008 0.006* 0.005** 0.001 
 
[-0.65] [-1.62] [-2.17] [2.73] [4.21] [1.86] [2.41] [3.27] [0.86] 
N 850,218 726,099 726,099 279,757 243,895 243,895 850,218 726,099 726,099 
R-sq 0.001 0.001 0.180 0.001 0.002 0.058 0.001 0.001 0.091 
t-statistics in brackets; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Appendix A 
In any given economy, the share of all wages paid out in bonuses in period t (the ‘bonus share’ for 
period t, or Bt) is computed as the ratio between the sum of all bonus payments (Bont) and the sum 
of all wages (TotWaget). That is: 
     𝐵𝑡 =  𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡     (1) 
The sum of all bonus payments in period t can be written as:  
       𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡𝐵. ?̅?𝑡𝐵.𝐸𝑡𝐵     (2) 
Where: 
𝐸𝑡
𝐵  is the total number of employees in firms that paid bonuses in period t  
?̅?𝑡
𝐵 is average regular (or base) pay per employee in these firms in period t 
𝐺𝑡
𝐵 is the multiple of all regular pay that is added to the wage bill in the form of bonus payments 
in bonus-paying firms (that is, the gearing of bonus pay to base pay within bonus-paying firms). 
This gearing is necessarily zero in non bonus-paying firms (𝐺𝑡𝑁=0). 
Similarly, the sum of all wages paid out in the economy can be expressed as the sum of: all bonuses 
paid out in bonus-paying firms; all regular pay paid out in bonus-paying firms; and all regular pay 
paid out in non bonus-paying firms. That is: 
     𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡𝐵 . ?̅?𝑡𝐵.𝐸𝑡𝐵 +  ?̅?𝑡𝐵.𝐸𝑡𝐵 +  ?̅?𝑡𝑁 .𝐸𝑡𝑁   (3) 
Where: 
𝐸𝑡
𝑁 is the total number of employees in firms that did not pay bonuses in period t 
?̅?𝑡
𝑁 is average regular (or base) pay per employee in these firms in period t. 
Let 𝑅𝑃𝑡 refer to the ratio between average regular pay per employee in bonus-paying firms and 
average regular pay per employee in non bonus-paying firms. We call this the ‘regular pay premium’ 
(or ‘base pay premium’) in favour of the average employee in a bonus-paying firm: 
      𝑅𝑃𝑡 =  ?̅?𝑡𝐵?̅?𝑡𝑁      (4) 
And let 𝐸𝑃𝑡 refer to the ratio between total employment in bonus-paying firms and total 
employment in non bonus-paying firms. We call this the ‘employment premium’ in favour of bonus-
paying firms: 
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      𝐸𝑃𝑡 =   𝐸𝑡𝐵𝐸𝑡𝑁      (5) 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and dividing all terms through by 1
?̅?𝑡
𝑁.𝐸𝑡𝑁 we then obtain the 
following: 
     𝐵𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡𝐵.𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡𝐵.𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 𝑅𝑃𝑡.𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 1    (6) 
We thereby express the share of all bonuses paid out in the economy (Bt) as a function of: 
(a) the employment premium in favour of bonus-paying firms (𝐸𝑃𝑡);  
(b) the pay premium in favour of employees in bonus paying firms (𝑅𝑃𝑡); and  
(c) the gearing of bonus pay to base pay within bonus-paying firms (𝐺𝑡𝐵). 
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Appendix B 
Table 1: Bonus share and its components, by bonus season, 2000-2010 
Part A: High season (December – March) 
 
Employment 
premium 
Base pay 
premium Gearing 
Base wage 
share 
Bonus 
share 
Bonus share index 
(2000=100) 
2000 1.07 1.03 17.8% 52.6% 8.6% 100 
2001 1.22 1.04 19.4% 55.9% 9.8% 114 
2002 1.18 1.06 16.3% 55.5% 8.3% 97 
2003 1.16 1.05 16.3% 55.1% 8.2% 96 
2004 1.15 1.05 18.6% 54.6% 9.2% 108 
2005 1.14 1.06 19.9% 54.7% 9.8% 115 
2006 1.13 1.07 23.1% 54.6% 11.2% 131 
2007 1.16 1.05 27.3% 55.1% 13.1% 153 
2008 1.14 1.05 27.4% 54.6% 13.0% 152 
2009 1.14 1.05 17.5% 54.5% 8.7% 102 
2010 1.10 1.04 21.6% 53.3% 10.3% 121 
2011 1.04 1.05 22.6% 52.0% 10.5% 123 
2012 1.03 1.07 20.5% 52.5% 9.7% 113 
2013 1.06 1.06 19.1% 52.8% 9.2% 107 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
Part B: Low season (April – November) 
 
Employment 
premium 
Base pay 
premium Gearing 
Base wage 
share 
Bonus 
share 
Bonus share index 
(2000=100) 
2000 1.12 1.02 7.8% 53.3% 4.0% 100 
2001 1.16 1.03 7.5% 54.5% 3.9% 98 
2002 1.13 1.03 7.1% 53.7% 3.7% 92 
2003 1.10 1.03 7.0% 53.2% 3.6% 90 
2004 1.09 1.04 7.6% 53.3% 3.9% 97 
2005 1.08 1.05 8.0% 53.2% 4.1% 103 
2006 1.09 1.04 9.1% 53.2% 4.6% 116 
2007 1.12 1.04 9.8% 53.8% 5.0% 125 
2008 1.11 1.05 9.1% 53.8% 4.7% 116 
2009 1.06 1.03 8.1% 52.2% 4.0% 101 
2010 1.00 1.03 7.7% 50.8% 3.8% 95 
2011 1.00 1.05 9.0% 51.1% 4.4% 110 
2012 1.02 1.05 9.0% 51.6% 4.4% 111 
Source: Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey 
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